I. INTRODUCTION
In Loving v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court held that the separation of powers principle does not preclude Congress from delegating its constitutional authority to the President to define the aggravating factors required under the Eighth Amendment to permit the imposition of a statutory death penalty in military capital cases. 2 In reaching its principal holding, the Court assumed that the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the Eighth Amendment 3 and the Court's death penalty jurisprudence constitutionally require the current military capital punishment scheme to include aggravating factors. 4 Having assumed the applicability of the Eighth Amendment, the Court next determined that the delegation doctrine did not preclude the President from prescribing the constitutionally required aggravating factors. 5 The Court then found that Congress explicitly exercised its power to delegate authority to the President in three specific provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),6 and further, that the President, acting as Commander-in-Chief, did not need further Congressional guidance in the exercise of that authority. 7 This Note argues that the Court's preliminary assumption-that Furman v. Georgia: 8 and its progeny are applicable in the military context-is the most notable aspect of this case. The Court has never before squarely held that a soldier has any constitutional rights when he is court-martialed, or indeed any constitutional rights at all. When confronted with military issues, the Supreme Court has consistently adhered to a highly deferential "hands-off" standard of review. 9 In doing so, the Court has rarely hesitated in denying constitutional protections to members of the armed forces. 10 What is thus most striking about Loving is that the Court declined to follow its customary course of deference to the military at the expense of otherwise applicable constitutional norms. Instead, the Court suggested that the requirements of the Eighth Amendment as articulated in Furman apply to the military's justice system." Two of the concurring opinions reflect the controversial nature of the Court's assumption: Justice Thomas directly questioned the assumption that the Eighth Amendment constitutional requirements of Furman apply to the military.1 2 On the other extreme, four Justices, in a concurrence authored by Justice Stevens, questioned the extent to which capital cases should even fall within courts-martial jurisdiction.' s This Note addresses the Court's typically deferential approach to military issues and suggests that the Court's deviation from that stance might best be understood as a recognition by the Court that the traditional standard of deference may be inappropriate in a military capital case, given the realities of today's military establishment and the unprecedented recent expansion of courts-martial jurisdiction.
II. 
Origins of Military Law
The military justice system predates the United States Constitution by at least several hundred years. Military judges existed as least as early as the Roman Empire, when Roman soldiers were subject to the absolute will of their commanders.1 4 In England, after the Norman Conquest, military justice was a matter of Royal prerogative. 15 Richard Coeur de Lion's Ordinance of 1190 deterred brawling among his crusaders by punishing offenders with "a series of penalties rang-The Framers of the United States Constitution were mindful of the limits Parliament set on the peacetime jurisdiction of courts-martial over capital crimes. Having themselves been subjected to the intemperance of military power in the colonies, the Framers were also aware of the dangers of autocratic military justice, and thus, harbored a deep distrust of military tribunals. 26 Among the wrongs cited in the Declaration of Independence were the subordination of civil power to the military, the quartering of troops in times of peace, and the commission of innumerable cruelties through the hands of the King's mercenaries. 2 7 Indeed, the Revolutionary War was fought, in part, as a protest against standing armies. 2 8 The experience of the Revolutionary War provided the background for what would become the "standing army" debate at the Constitutional Convention over whether to have a standing army or a militia. 2 9 Having rebelled against oppressive British Rule, many citizens feared the maintenance of a peacetime army. 3 0 At the same time, however, many citizens saw the War as evidence that the new nation needed a strong standing army. 31 Such thoughts were upper most in the minds of the Founding Fathers in 1775, when they passed the first legislation of the Continental Congress, which dealt extensively with discipline in the military. The Framers expressly distrusted the notion of a standing army.
3 3 Yet, recognizing the need for a means to discipline the troops swiftly and without the required formalities of civilian justice, the Continental Congress adopted the American Articles of War, which authorized a national armed force. The Framers' distrust of unmitigated military power found expression in the Constitution, which provided for the careful diffusion of the war powers between the three separate branches of government. 3 5 The Framers purposely provided a separate court system for the armed forces and did not include military courts in Article III, which established the federal judiciary. 36 Instead, Congress established courts-martial 37 under its Article I powers, 3 8 which grant Congress the authority to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces." 3 9 Historically, the function of the military justice system was to ensure disciplined troops, and the court-martial was a tool that could be used at the commander's complete discretion to instill fear and obedience in his soldiers. 40 The prevailing view among military commanders and politicians alike was that in order to be effective, military justice must be swift and harsh. Throughout the 1800's, commanders of the military accepted and vigorously defended the brutal nature of militaryjustice. 42 Despite some failed attempts to reform manifest deficiencies in the military justice system, 43 interest in reform did not develop for almost another 1786, 1806, 1874, 1916, 1920, and 1948 . Among the changes were the reduction of the number of members required to convene a general court-martial, changes in the designation of officers empowered to convene courts-martial, and the addition of a field officer court-martial, precursor of the summary court-martial. David Schlueter, The Court-Martiak An Historical Survey, 87 MIL. L. RE%. 129, 131-44 (1980) (tracing the present day system of military discipline to the Roman Empire). 35 The Founders recognized that the exigencies of military discipline would require a different balance of individual rights and government interests than is appropriate for civilian society. Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 139-40 (1953 44 In the early part of the twentieth century Brigadier General Samuel T. Ansell, the acting Judge Advocate General of the Army, proposed a drastic change to the 1916 Articles of War. 45 Critical of the Army's lack of a formal appeals process for courts-martial convictions and the lack of disciplinary and sentencing uniformity throughout the different command units, Ansell advocated creation of a centralized mandatory review system in the form of an appellate tribunal. 4 6 Ansell's proposals, however, were not adopted in the 1920 Articles due largely to the opposition of Provost Marshall General Crowder, the principal author of the 1916 articles and an outspoken defender of the then-existing system. 47 During World War II, the nation witnessed its largest military mobilization in history. 48 More than 16 million men and women volunteered for, or were conscripted into, active military service. 49 By the end of the war, military courts had convened over two million courtsmartial, 50 and the tens of thousands of citizens who had been subjected to the military's system of discipline returned to tell stories of the grave injustices perpetrated by the military courts. 5 1 Widespread disenchantment with the military justice system finally instigated a movement towards reform, 52 which culminated in the enactment of The Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice (UCMJ) in 1950.
5 3 The enactment of the UCMJ represented the first significant change in the administration of military discipline in the American armed forces since the adoption of the Articles of War by the Continental Congress in 1775.54 The primary drafter of the UCMJ, Professor Edmund Morgan, had served under General Ansell and incorporated into the UCMJ many of the reforms first proposed by General Ansell over four decades earlier. 55 Among the changes brought by the adoption of the UCMJ was, as its title suggested, uniformity among the several services. For the first time in the nation's history, the procedural and substantive law of military discipline was to be the same in all of the military services. 56 In addition, the UCMJ created a centralized review panel in each of the armed forces which had jurisdiction to hear the appeals of defendants whose sentences had reached certain jurisdictional thresholds. 5 7 The UCMJ also created the Court of Military Appeals, a three member panel of civilian judges having jurisdiction to hear mandatory appeals in cases involving the death penalty. 58
Expansion of Court-Martial Jurisdiction
Debate over the proper jurisdiction of military courts extends back to the birth of American military law in the 17th century. 59 The British Articles of War gave military courts jurisdiction over both military and civilian offenses, 60 as did the American Articles of War. 61 The Framers, however, were wary of military jurisdiction. 62 This distrust led the Framers to delegate to Congress the power to make rules for the military. Despite the Framers' concern for limiting military power, from 55 Hundley & Lederer, supra note 47, at 635. 56 Prior to the enactment of the UCMJ, the conduct of soldiers had been regulated by the Articles of War, the conduct of sailors and marines by the Articles for the Governance of the Navy, 34 U.S.C. § 1200, and the conduct of the Coast Guardsmen by other laws, 14 U.S.C. § § 561-76 (1946) 63 See id. at 441. The Constitution gives Congress the power and the responsibility to define and punish offenses against the law of nations, declare war, raise and support armies, provide and maintain a navy, make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, provide for calling forth the militia, provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and make all laws which may be necessary and proper to execute these powers. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10-18.
1866 to 1960, courts-martial jurisdiction was based solely on military status-whether the accused was a member of the "land or naval forces." 64 Thus, a service-member could be tried by courts-martial for any crime, irrespective of a connection to his status as a servicemember.
65
In 1969, the Court reigned in the authority of courts-martial judges by imposing the service-connection test set out in O'Callahan v. Parker. 6 6 In O'Callahan,Justice Douglas, writing for a five member majority, denied court-martial jurisdiction in a case involving the off-base assault and attempted rape of a civilian victim.
6 7 For the first time, the Court recognized that the status of an accused as a member of the "land or naval forces," without more, is insufficient to subject the accused to court-martial jurisdiction. 68 Moreover, the Court held that a crime must be "service-connected" for it to fall under the military's jurisdiction. 69 The Court intended to prevent "'cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service time of 79 In Solorio, the Court overruled the service-connection rule, holding that a member of the armed forces could be tried by a court-martial for any offense regardless of its service-connection. 8 0 Solorio involved a Coast Guardsman charged with sexually molesting the young daughters of two fellow guardsmen while on active duty in Juneau, Alaska. 81 The offenses allegedly occurred in a civilian community where both Solorio and his victims lived due to a shortage of government housing. 8 2 The incidents were discovered after Solorio's transfer to New York, where a general court-martial was convened to try him for the alleged crimes in Alaska. 83 77 Reford, 401 U.S. at 367-70. The 12 factors that would tend to defeat court-martial subject matter jurisdiction as enumerated in Relford are: (1) the serviceman's proper absence form the base; (2) the crime's commission away from the base; (3) its commission at a place not under military control; (4) its commission within U.S. territory and not in an occupied zone of a foreign country; (5) its commission in peacetime and its being unrelated to authority stemming from the war power, (6) the absence of any connection between accused's military duties and the crime; (7) the victim's not being engaged in performance of any duty relating to the military; (8) the presence and availability of a civilian court in which the case may be prosecuted; (9) the absence of any flouting of military authority;, (10) the absence of any threat to a military post; (11) the absence of any violation of military property; and (12) the offense being among those traditionally prosecuted in civilian courts. The Articles, by these words, expressly excluded from the jurisdiction of courts-martial, and, by necessary implication, reserves for the cognizance of the civil courts, (in times of peace), all capital crimes of (1) Members of a regular component of the armed forces, including those awaiting discharge after expiration of their terms of enlistment; volunteers from the time of their muster or acceptance into the armed forces; inductees from the time of their actual induction into the armed forces; and other persons lawfully called or ordered into, or to duty in or for training in, the armed forces, from the dates when they are required by the terms of the call or order to obey it.
(2) Cadets, aviation cadets, and midshipmen. (11) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, persons serving with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces outside the United States and outside the Canal Zone, the commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands.
(12) Subject to any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may be a party or to any accepted rule of international law, persons within an area leased by or otherwise reserved or acquired for the use of the United States which is under the control of the Secretary concerned and which is outside the United States and outside the Canal Zone, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. Article 2(a), UCMJ. 98 Congress expanded military jurisdiction and permitted the military to try a service-member for the civilian capital offense of murder for the first time during the Civil War.
1 0 1 The relevant statute limited the military's jurisdiction over the offense, however, to "time of war, insurrection, or rebellion."' 0 2 Indeed, the Court held that the statute had no application when "the civil courts were open and in the undisturbed exercise of its jurisdiction."
Moreover, the Court recognized that in order for a non-military offense to be tried by the military, the offense had to be one that prejudiced good order and discipline.1 04 Subsequently, in 1916, Congress extended courts-martial jurisdiction to specified non-military offenses, such as larceny, robbery, and assault, irrespective of prejudice to good order and discipline.' 0 5 At the same time, Congress expressly provided that murder and rape were punishable by death in a court-martial, but also explicitly provided that "no person shall be tried by court-martial for murder or rape committed within the geographical limits of the States of the Union, and the District of Columbia in time of peace."1O 6
While Congress extensively revised the Articles of War in 1920, the provisions relating to the jurisdiction over non-military offenses remained substantially unchanged until the enactment of the UCMJ in 1950. In the UCMJ, Congress extended the military's jurisdiction to try service members for murder and rape within the geographical limits of the United States for capital offenses in peacetime. 123 The opinion cited the language from Parker which approved the different applications of First Amendment protections in the military context. 24 Glines proferred "military discipline" in support of the validity of the regulations. 2 5 Glines thus extended the deferential standard first announced in Parker into a new arena. Parker invoked the special demands of the military to permit limits on First Amendment speech during wartime in the presence of troops about to enter combat In Glines, the Court extended this same standard of deference in a peacetime setting.
The Supreme Court again faced the question of deference to the military in peacetime when President Carter resumed draft registration in 1980. In Rostker v. Goldberg, 2 6 the registration of only males was challenged as unconstitutional gender discrimination. In Rostker, the Court denied this challenge 1 2 7 and again articulated a standard of deference to the military. 1 2 8 The Court cited Parker and Glines to sup-119 See, e.g., id. at 742 (noting that even court of appeals acknowledged in some circumstance "different standards might ... be applicable in considering vagueness challenges to provisions which govern the conduct of members of the Armed forces"); id. at 744 (citations to various authorities suggesting military society is "a society apart form civilian society"); id at 756 (Congress has more latitude in legislating for military than for civilian society); id at 758 (first amendment to be applied differently to military than to civilian port the proposition that military matters require a special degree of judicial deference. 129 The Court declined to apply a "mid-level" scrutiny test, its normal approach to sex discrimination, 1 30 declaring that decisions involving military matters need not pass heightened scrutiny. 13 ' In the Court's view, judicial deference must be at its maximum when the Court reviews unconstitutional government action in the military arena. 13 2 Consequently, just as the standard for reviewing free speech claims against the military became more deferential than the standard in a civilian context after Levy and Glines, so too the standard for reviewing gender-based discrimination claims against the military became much more deferential with Rostker. 33 The Court's standard of deference reached its pinnacle in United States v. Stanley.' 34 In Stanley, the Court denied Sergeant James B. Stanley redress for injuries he sustained as a result of secret and nonconsensual administration of LSD to him as part of an Army experiment. 135 Stanley had volunteered for an Army program he had been told was designed to test protective clothing and equipment. 136 Instead, he was given lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) without his knowledge or consent.' 37 The drug caused severe personality changes in Stanley that led to his discharge from the service and the breakup of his marriage. 138 29-37 (1987). As Eighth Amendment jurisprudence evolved in cases where capital sentencing was at issue, individual members of the Supreme Court began to adopt the concept that death should be treated differently from all other punishments. Of those Justices currently on the Court, Justice Stevens endorsed the distinction in his opinion in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637 (1980) (noting that "significant constitutional difference between the death penalty and lesser punishments" is that death requires imposition based on reason not emotion).
Justice O'Connor, shortly afterjoining the Court, also adopted the "death is different" doctrine:
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EIGHTH AMENDMENT/MILITARY schemes of three states as violative of the Eighth Amendment prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. 14 The Court struck down these statutes because the sentencing portions did not guard against the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty. 14 7 Although the Court was unable to muster a majority, or even a plurality, 148 the decision effectively invalidated the capital punishment schemes of every state permitting the death penalty.
149
Prior to Furman, definitive standards for imposing the death penalty were non-existent, allowing the sentencing judge or jury total discretion in imposing death sentences. 150 Although Furman did not provide express guidelines for imposing a valid death sentence, the message of the majority was clear: the Court would strike down as unconstitutional statutes that allowed juries unguided and unfettered discretion in imposing capital sentences. 15 157 three of the so-called "76 cases," were announced on the same day. 158 In each case, the Court declared constitutional the sentencing statute because each assured that the sentencing authority would receive sufficient information and guidance to produce principled and fair sentencing. 59
D.
APPLICATION OF 'URMANTO COURTS-MARTIAL It is unclear how the Eighth Amendment applies to the military. The question of the Eighth Amendment's applicability has been generally limited to the type of punishment allowed. 160 The Justices who comprised the Furman majority did not indicate that they contemplated applying the decision to courts-martial. The Furman dissenters, outraged at the sweeping holding, did assert that it affected provisions of the UCMJ, 16 1 but the majority failed to respond to these assertions.
In 1973, the D.C. Circuit reviewed a military death sentence that had been commuted to life imprisonment before Furman was decided.
62
In dicta, the court noted that 166 The court acknowledged that "there may be circumstances under which the rules governing the capital punishment of servicemembers will differ from those applicable to citizens." 16 7 Nevertheless, the CMA concluded that the crimes that Matthews committed had "no characteristics which, for purposes of applying the prohibition against 'cruel and unusual punishments,' distinguish them from similar crimes tried regularly in State and Federal courts." 16 8 Having determined that there was no "military necessity" for distinguishing courts-martial capital sentencing procedures from their civilian counterparts, 169 the CMA applied Supreme Court precedent to the military justice system.' 7 0
Upon reviewing Supreme Court precedent, the Matthews court found that constitutionally valid death penalty statutes shared certain common features, including a bifurcated sentencing procedure, the presence of aggravating factors, and the opportunity for the defendant to present unlimited extenuating and mitigating evidence.
171
Based upon this analysis, the CMA upheld as valid most of the death penalty procedures followed in courts-martial; however, the CMA did find one fundamental defect: the failure of the UCMJ or the RCM to require that courts-martial members "specifically identify the aggravating factors upon which they have relied in choosing to impose the death penalty."' 7 2 In light of this defect, the court reversed Matthews' death sentence, but stated in dicta that either Congress or the President could lawfully remedy the defect in the UCMJ capital sentencing scheme. 173 The President, not Congress, subsequently acted to coring in Furman suggests that it is inapplicable to the military. The per curium carves out no exceptions to the prohibition against discretionary death sentences. The opinions of the five-member majority recognize no basis for excluding the members of the Armed Forces from protection against this form of punishment." Id. at 271 n.5 (Marshall,J., dissenting)). THE CURRENT UCMJ CAPITAL PUNISHMENT SCHEME
The UCMJ permits the imposition of the death penalty for eleven purely military offenses 177 and three traditional common law crimes: premeditated murder, 178 felony murder, 79 and rape. 8 0 The only offense carrying a mandatory death penalty is wartime spying; all others are permissive, namely: premeditated murder, murder committed in the course of certain felonies, rape, mutiny, certain types of espionage, and certain other wartime offenses. 18 1 As of the 1996 Supreme Court term, Congress had not revised the death sentencing provisions of the UCMJ since the Code was enacted.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On the evening of December 11, 1988, Dwight Loving, an Army Private stationed at Fort Hood, Texas, robbed at gun-point two 7-Eleven convenience stores in the town of Killeen.1 8 2 When the two robberies netted him only ninety dollars, Loving conceived a plan to 174 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, (1995 ed.). RCM 1004 had actually been circulated for public comment prior to the Matthews decision and it was specifically cited in the Matthews opinion. Matthews, 16 Mj. at 381.
'75 RCM 1004 requires a unanimous finding that the accused is guilty of a capital offense before a death sentence may be imposed. RCM 1004(a) (2). The Rule also requires unanimous findings that at least one aggravating factor is present and that any extenuating or mitigating circumstances are substantially outweighed by any admissible aggravating factor. RCM 1004(b) (4) (A). The Rule also provides that the accused is to have "broad latitude" in extenuation and mitigation, RCM 1004(b) (3), and is entitled to have members of the courts-martial instructed to consider all such evidence before deciding upon a death sentence. RCM 1004(b) (6).
176 RCM 1004(c). rob taxicab drivers. 18 3 On the following evening, December 12, 1988, Loving called a taxicab to take him from a store in Killeen to his barracks at Fort Hood. 8 4 The driver of the taxicab was an active-duty soldier, Christopher Fay.' 8 5 Loving directed Fay to a secluded area where he robbed Fay at gun-point and then shot him twice in the back of the head, killing him.1 8 6 Loving then walked to his barracks and callled another taxicab after counting the money he received from Fay. 187 The second cab was driven by retired sergeant Bobby Sharbino.' 88 Loving directed Sharbino to a secluded area, robbed him, and then shot him in the head, killing him.' 89 Later that evening, Loving took his girlfriend to a nightclub in Killeen.' 9 0 Upon leaving the club, the two entered a taxicab driven by Howard Harrison. 19 After dropping his girlfriend off near her home, Loving directed Harrison to a secluded area and robbed him at gun-point. In order to ensure UCMJ Article 118's constitutional validity, the Court reasoned, additional aggravating factors establishing a heightened culpability were necessary.
27
The Court turned next to the question of whether the separation of powers doctrine precluded Congress from delegating to the President its authority to prescribe aggravating factors. 22 8 The Court outlined the purposes of the separation of powers doctrine and its corollary, the delegation doctrine, as threefold: (1) to defend against arbitrary and tyrannical rule, (2) to create an effective and accountable government, and (3) to prevent Congress from forsaking its du- and (2) the English experience the Framers understood the necessity of balancing efficient military discipline, popular control of a standing army, and the rights of the soldiers ... "241 The power to regulate the armed forces, the Court reasoned, was given to Congress "without limitation: Because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the corresponding extent & variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them ... "242 Accordingly, there was no reason why Congress should not be able to delegate to the President the authority to prescribe the aggravating factors which allowed Loving to be sentenced to his death. 243 Having determined that Congress rightfully exercised its power of delegation, the Court turned to the second prong of Loving's constitutional challenge: even if Congress had the authority to delegate to the President the authority to promulgate aggravating factors, Congress did not implicitly or explicitly do so. 
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Court noted that since 1950, when the UCMJ was enacted, the President has often used his authority under these articles to refine military sentencing within statutory bounds. 249 This past practice, the Court maintained, suggests that the President had clear authority to prescribe capital aggravating factors. 250 Lastly, the Court rejected Loving's argument that Congress failed to provide guiding principles to the President in prescribing aggravating factors, finding no need for such guidance "given the nature of the delegation and the officer who is to exercise the delegated authority." 251 Congress, the Court noted, may delegate its power to set sentencing standards, so long as it provides "intelligible principles" for the establishment of punishments. 25 2 The requirement of an "intelligible principle" seeks to enforce the delegation doctrine's primary precept: to prevent Congress from conveying away its lawmaking function. 253 In this case, however, the Court found that the intelligible principle requirement was unneccessary as the delegated authority was already within the scope of presidential duties under his role of Commander-in-Chief. 2 54 Moreover, the Court noted, the President has had congressional authority to intervene when courts-martial have ordered death sentences since the early days of the Republic.
2 55 It would thus be inconsistent, the Court reasoned, to question the competency of the President to prescribe aggravating factors absent an intelligible principle in this instance.
6 B. JUSTICE STEVENS' CONCURRENCE
In a concurrence, 25 7 justice Stevens clarified that, while joining in the Court's result, he did not thereby accept the proposition that dence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts, but which may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter." 10 U.S.CA § 836(a) (West 1996 In a concurring opinion, 266 Justice Scalia joined in the majority opinion except with respect to the Court's discussion of English history. 267 Justice Scalia deemed the discussion irrelevant to determining the limits of Congress's power. 268 The history surveyed by the Court 258 438 U.S. 435 (1987) (holding that jurisdiction of courts-martial depends solely on accused's status as a member of the armed forces, and not on the "service connection" of the offense charged. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment of Solorio but wrote separately, id. at 457, to object to the unnecessary and unwise overruling of O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), which had stood for the principle that court-martial jurisdiction depends on the "service connection" of the offense charged).
259 Loving 116 S. Ct. at 1752 (Stevens, J., concurring). 260 Id-at 1751 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens noted that petitioner's first victim was a member of the Armed Forces on active duty and that the second was a retired serviceman who gave petitioner a ride from the barracks on the same night as the first killing. Id. well-established the permissible scope of courts-martial jurisdiction over certain classes of offenses and defendants. 26 9 However, Justice Scalia pointed out, Loving did not question the jurisdiction of the court. 270 Loving's argument dealt with Congress' delegation of authority to the President to prescribe the aggravating factors which allowed the court-martial to impose the death penalty. 27 1 The response to Loving's argument, Scalia contended, resides not in English history, but rather, in the text of the Constitution. 272 Accordingly, the majority's historical exposition was of no consequence to the issue before the Court and should have been "left aside." 27 3
Justice Scalia also took issue with the Court's practice of referring to Congress' assignment of responsibilities to the Executive as "delegations of legislative authority." 274 Justice Scalia pointed out that the term "delegations of legislative authority" is misleading because such "delegations" can not, by definition, constitutionally exist. 275 Congress is strictly prohibited by the Constitution from "delegat[ing] its legislative authority." 2 76 Rather, as Justice Scalia clarified, "Congress assigns responsibilities to the Executive, and when the Executive undertakes those assigned responsibilities, it acts, not as a "delegate" of Congress, but as the "agent of the people."
277

D. JUSTICE THOMAS' CONCURRENCE
Although Justice Thomas concurred unequivocally in the Court's judgment, 2 78 he wrote separately to suggest that the question of whether the Eighth Amendment vis-a-vis Furman applies to the military still remains unanswered. 279 Unlike the majority, which assumed that Furman applied to the instant case, Thomas remained skeptical that the rules developed under the Eighth Amendment for the prosecution of civilian cases, including the requirement of proof of aggravating factors, apply to capital prosecutions in the military. 280 Justice Thomas agreed with the majority's result without deciding whether capital courts-martial require aggravating factors. 281 In light of Congress' express constitutional authority to regulate the Armed Forces, 2 82 Thomas contended, "the sentencing scheme at issue in the case, and the manner in which it was created, are constitutionally unassailable." 28 3
Justice Thomas also agreed with Justice Scalia's characterization of the historical analysis conducted by the majority. 2 84 Justice Thomas expanded upon Justice Scalia's point and noted, not only the irrelevance of the exercise, 285 but also the "simplistic" and speculative conclusions that the majority drew regarding the significance of English military history to the Framers' allocation of constitutional authority. Never before has the Court squarely held that service-members retain Eighth Amendment protections, or indeed any of the same constitutional rights that they are commissioned to defend. 2 87 Faced with military issues, the Court has consistently eschewed careful scrutiny of military restrictions on service-members' constitutional rights and has instead assumed a highly deferential standard of review. The Court's uncharacteristic assumption in Loving thus signals a long overdue recognition that the realities of today's military create a need for increased constitutional safeguards and have outgrown the Court's tradition of supine deference. This Note analyzes the historical underpinnings of the Court's tradition of deference to the military and argues that the realities of the modem military render the Court's rationales wholly obsolete.
A. OUTDATED STANDARD OF DEFERENCE
The Supreme Court has stated that service-members have consti- 288 However, historically, the Court has generally refrained from questioning the decisions of military courts, instead deferring to congressional decisions on appropriate disciplinary procedures. 2 8 9 Deference to military decisions and the deprivation of service-member's constitutional rights which often accompanies it, has long been the Supreme Court's rule of decision.m°T he Court has justified its "healthy deference to legislative and executive judgments in the area of military affairs"2' on three separate bases: first, the doctrine of separation of powers mandates such deference; 292 second, the military's unique status as a separate community requires a narrow judicial role; and third, the inherent inability of the judicial system to competently scrutinize the competing 738 (1975) , the Court further limited federal intervention ip. the military justice system, stating that Congress has "never deemed it appropriate to confer on this Court appellate jurisdiction to supervise the administration of criminal justice in the military. Nor had Congress conferred on any Art. III court jurisdiction directly to review courts-martial determinations." Id. at 746. The Court further noted that that "this Court repeatedly has recognized that, of necessity, 'Military law.., is ajurisprudence which exists separate and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishments.'" I& (citations omitted).
290 See supra notes 108-143 and accompanying text. rights to petition the government, 2 97 and a different standard of procedural due process. 2 98 However, given the realities of the modem military, the Supreme Court's deferential standard of judicial review and corresponding refusal to extend constitutional rights doctrine to the military is obsolete.
Separation of Powers Rationale
Among the traditional justifications for the Judiciary's deference to the Military, the Supreme Court has stated that some form of deference is constitutionally mandated by the doctrine of separation of powers. 2 99 The Judiciary occupies a sensitive position when it reviews military cases. Explicit constitutional powers have been granted to both the executive and the legislative branches of government, 30 0 but the Judiciary is without a specific constitutional grant. The Court has invoked this constitutional scheme to explain its deference to the [Vol. 87 munity as a justification in support of it principle of deference.
3 1 '
The "separate community doctrine" focuses on the distinct purpose of the armed forces-to protect the United States, and its interests, against the actions of foreign nations, through the use of force. The Court's "separate community" rationale for deference is inappropriate given that it is founded on notions of the Military that no longer comport with reality. The military society of the past no longer exists. The modem military establishment is a major arm of the government, with jurisdiction over 3.5 million United States citizens, including not only individuals on active duty, but also reservists and compensated retirees. 31 cal, maintenance, and service jobs that never expose them to combat conditions. The duties of military computer programmers, truck mechanics and cooks are not intrinsically different from their civilian counterparts, nor do they require the full rigors of traditional military discipline designed to ready soldiers to perform reliably in combat. Further, the system's once limited subject matter jurisdiction now embraces crimes that relate only indirectly to the military and that would have previously been heard only in civilian courts. 3 1 9 Perhaps the "separate community" was a valid description for the 18th century military society, when armed forces constituted an isolated, homogeneous, voluntarily entered into society. However, even the Framers did not foresee a modem military of such enormous proportions. When the Framers debated the role of the military in the new nation, military justice consisted of courts-martial proceedings with jurisdiction over a 675-man army for purely military offenses. Even then, the Framers were concerned with preventing the growth of a large, expensive and powerful military 3 21 and were opposed to courts-martial jurisdiction in times of peace. 32 2 Deeply distrustful of the notion of a standing army, the Framers specifically provided for the diffusion of war powers among the separate branches of government in order to prevent its creation. 3 23 This diffusion of power, however, did not entirely allay the Framers' distrust. Concern for the inevitable tension between individual rights and the needs of the military also played out in the fight for the Bill of Rights.
3 24 The rights of civilians against the potential exercise of unmitigated military power are also clearly espoused in the Constitution. 3 25 Yet, the original constitutional approval of a limited courts-martial system used solely as an instrument of military discipline has been extended to today's vast and complex system, which confers jurisdiction over millions of persons, some with only a tenuous connection to the service, for crimes unrelated to the maintenance of military discipline.
3 26 The danger that the system will not adequately protect the 321 At the time of the Constitutional Convention, consideration was given to forever limiting the size of the National Army to a few thousand men through an express constitutional provision. Warren, supra note 27, at 187. [Vol. 87
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due process rights of military defendants looms large and thus demands more rigorous judicial scrutiny.
Judicial Incompetence Rationale
A third justification commonly proffered in support of the doctrine of deference centers on the perceived limits of the Court's competence in dealing with the complex aspects of the military establishment. 3 2 7 In a speech given at the New York Law Center in 1962, then-Chief Justice Earl Warren captured the essence of the incompetence justification for deference when he stated:
Courts are rn-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority might have. Many of the problems of the military society are, in a sense, alien to the problems with which the judiciary is trained to deal.
28
The professional judgment and experience of those familiar with military needs is the primary source for determining the climate of obedience and discipline necessary to sustain an effective fighting force. Traditionally, the Court has determined itself incapable of mastering the complexities which are considered when balancing constitutional rights against military functional necessity. 32 9 As a consequence, the Court argues that the scope of review must be narrowed to reflect this inability of the judiciary to master the complexities of military ajudication. 330 The tradition of judicial deference began when the military was composed of a small group of professional soldiers whose training and activities were primarily combat related. 331 Internal decision-making generally focused on such uniquely military problems as combat strategy, troop deployment, morale, and discipline. 332 In the face of such narrow and sensitive military concerns, civilian courts feared they lacked the expertise to assess the impact of their decisions on the moral and discipline of the troops, and thus refrained from careful scrutiny of military restrictions on constitutional protections.
33
The military, however, has undergone a major evolution from a 327 Warren, supra note 27, at 187. 328 I& 329 See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1988) (stating that the special relationships which define military life have "supported the military's establishment's broad power to deal with its own personnel. The most obvious reason is that the courts are illequipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority might have."). Thus, as the "primary business" of the Military grows to include many non-combat and civilian-oriented activities, the purpose and impact of military regulations are no longer limited to narrow, parochial interests and often intrude within the sphere of civilian comprehension. When conduct neither interferes with military operations nor undermines a specific military concern, sweeping deference to military decsionmaking is unwarranted. The Court's assertion that its competence is limited by military complexities is also unconvincing given the complex, technical and non-legal issues which courts regularly consider. Why should the Court consider itself any more competent in dealing with a complex and intricate security matter than it does balancing constitutional rights against the needs of the military? Indeed, the Judiciary is uniquely qualified to balance the values embodied in individual constitutional rights against even genuine military necessity. Only the courts are experts in constitutional law, and their view of the proper constitutional balance should therefore prevail.
VI.
CONCLUSION
In Loving v. United States, the Court assumed that the constitutional requirements of the Eighth Amendment, as articulated in Furman v. Georgia, apply to the Military. This assumption was significant given the Court's historical reluctance to interfere with the methods of military procedure. When the Court assumed the applicability of the Eighth Amendment to the military it did so mindful of the historical necessities and events which have shaped the modem military. English Constitutional history and its impact upon the thinking of the framers figured prominently in the Court's opinion, as did the growth of the Military and the corresponding expansion of courts-martial jurisdiction. Indeed, it was an attention to and understanding of this history and the realities of today's Military which permitted the Court to deviate from its tradition of supine deference and undertake a more contemporary balancing of service-members constitutional rights with military necessity. Given the realties of the modem mili- 
